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2Abstract
Research by Campion and Lord (1982) suggested that the goal-setting process could be 
explicated by a control systems model of self-regulated behavior. However, as noted by Campion 
and Lord (1982), the model did not specify the process performers used to select their standards. 
To address this deficiency and to further specify the control process, I proposed an expanded 
model of human performance: an integration of VIE theory (Vroom, 1964) and control systems 
theory (Carver & Scheier, 1981). The model posited that performers select standards of perform­
ance based on their motivational force. It also specified when cognitive or behavioral control 
responses would be applied and the direction of those responses. Further, it specified the 
temporal relation among control responses and the role of self-focus, a personality variable, in the 
control process. A test of six hypotheses derived from the model was conducted over a 15-week 
academic semester. The test employed a sample of two hundred and forty subjects enrolled in an 
introductory psychology course. The study found that when corrections were made for unrelia­
bility, motivational force accounted for over 77% of the variance in the choice of a performance 
standard. It also found that when the focal standard and performance were disparate and the 
motivational force of the focal standard was no longer sufficient to elicit performance consistent 
withthestandard,thatperformersmorefrequentlyelectedtochangetheirfocalstandard. Further, 
it found that performers more frequently applied effort change to ameliorate performance- 
standard disparities when the motivational force of the focal standard remained prepotent than 
when the motivational force of the focal standard degraded. In sum, this research did not prove to 
be an appropriate test of the hypothesized temporal relation among control responses, nor did it 
support the hypothesized role of self-focus in the control process. However, this research 
provides strong support for the integration of VIE and control theory. It found that performers 
select standards of performance based on their motivational force. Further, it advances the control 
theory perspective of the goal-setting and changing process by specifying when effort or standard 
changes are made and the direction of those changes.
3A Longitudinal Test of a Proposed VIE Theoretic Control Systems Model of 
Self-Regulated Human Performance
Campion and Lord (1982) posited that the goat setting process could be explicated by 
a control systems model of self-regulated behavior. To test their model, Campion and Lord 
(1982) employed a series of questionnaires to measure student test and course grade 
expectations, effort, and performance over a 10-week academic quarter. Based on the results 
of their study, the researchers concluded that the control systems model was an apt descriptor 
of the goal setting process. However, as noted by Campion and Lord (1982), their research did 
not specify the process performers used to select their standards.
To address this deficiency and to further specify the control process, research was 
conducted to test a model of human performance: an amalgam of valence-instrumentality- 
expectancy (VIE) theory and control systems theory. Before presenting the results of that 
research, I will present an introduction to the model and its constituents.
To begin, control systems theory will be presented followed by a presentation of VIE 
theory, the rationale for their integration, and the specification of an integrated model. 
Following a discussion of the Campion and Lord (1982) study and the contributions of an 
integrated model, hypotheses derived from the integrated model and a research methodology 
will be presented. To conclude, a presentation of the results, a discussion of the findings, and 
their implications will follow.
4Control Systems Theory
Control systems theory has been with us for some time (Cannon, 1929; Wiener, 1948). 
It has been applied to such areas as physiology, mathematics, engineering, and economics 
(Balakrishnan, 1973; Berkovitz, 1974; Cannon, 1929; Dransfield, 1968). It has also been 
applied to such topics in psychiatry and psychology as runaway build-up of rage in paranoiacs 
(Shibutani, 1968), drug addiction (Wilkins, 1968), human behavior (Powers, 1973), goal setting 
(Campion & Lord, 1982), skilled performance (Pew, 1970), and organizational behavior 
(Lawler, 1976). The control systems model, a cybernetic (Wiener, 1948) or an information 
processing (Lindsay & Norman, 1977) model, portrays a process whereby sensors abstract 
information from the environment, compare this information via a comparator against a 
standard, and effect change when appropriate. Though a qualitative description of control 
theory is quite simple, when considered in detail it can become an abstract and complex 
process (Carver & Scheier, 1981a), often requiring highly sophisticated mathematical 
techniques (Rouse, 1977). Because control systems theory can be easily understood and 
applied at a qualitative level, presentation will be void of a discussion of the differential 
equation, or alternatively, multivariate and time-series analyses employed within the context of 
discrete-time systems (Rouse, 1977).
Control systems theory is fundamentally a theory of selective information processing 
and control (Powers, 1973). Though it can be conceptualized as a process supportive of an 
organism’s effort to persevere in a particular behavior in spite of perturbations from its internal 
or external environment (Cannon, 1932; Jones, 1973), it can also be viewed as an agent of 
change (Campion & Lord, 1982). Regardless of one’s control theory perspective, feedback is 
central to the control systems process.
Open and C iosed  Loop Contro l
Feedback is such a common part of our lives (Peterson, 1982), that the extent to which 
we depend on it is often overlooked. When absent, task performance that would otherwise be
considered quite simple becomes difficult. Eliminating feedback, that is, interrupting the flow 
of information from the output back to the system input, provides no way to detect and correct 
for discrepancies. In contrast, feedback by way of a closed loop system provides a means of 
minimizing the effects of environmental perturbations (Jagacinski, 1977).
The N a tu re  of F e e d b a c k  Loops
Because the thermostat is an oftcited exemplar of control theory, it may lead one to 
believe that all control systems attempt to minimize deviations between the present 
environmental state and the standard (Carver & Scheier, 1982a). Though negative feedback 
loops are common, deviation-amplifying or positive feedback loops exist, as well (Carver & 
Scheier, 1982a). Such feedback systems act to exaggerate sensed discrepancies. Positive 
feedback loops taken by themselves are inherently unstable and self-destructive (Maruyama,
1963); if they are not inputs to a superordinate system which can restrain them, they continue 
to amplify until the system self-destructs.
H ie r a r c h ic a l  O rgan iza t ion
Because control theory is fundamentally a theory of information processing and 
control, a hierarchical ordering of standards is assumed (Powers, 1973). A hierarchically 
ordered system is one in which attainment of a subsystem requisite is linked to attainment of a 
superordinate system requisite (Powers, 1973); the standard of the subordinate system is an 
output of a superordinate system. At the very lowest level of the behavioral hierarchy in an 
animal system, the behavior manifests itself as changes in muscle tension (Carver & Scheier, 
1982b). Whereas changes in muscle tension results in the movement of body parts, likewise, 
body parts results in changes to the environment.
In fo rm at io n  Abstrac t ion
Through the control system’s behavioral hierarchy, the results of behavior are 
presumed to be a function of monitoring selective information inputs at various levels of 
abstraction (Norman, 1981; Reason, 1979). Information, "anything that reduces uncertainty
6(Brody, 1970)," can be abstracted in terms of the characteristics that exist at the various levels 
of analysis to which it has been subjected (Hubei & Wiesel, 1963, 1965; Palmer, 1977). For 
example, scores obtained from students enrolled in an introductory psychology course are by 
themselves informative, though marginally. From this same set of scores, when subjected to a 
higher level of analysis, it is possible to abstract additional information (e.g., group means). A 
still higher level of analysis could yield information regarding the distribution of score 
deviations about the mean, the nature of differences between the means of groups, the 
significance of group differences, and the probability that groups were drawn from different 
populations. It can be seen from the test score analog that we can selectively attend to and 
abstract information from a variety of sources within our environment and at various levels, as 
well.
S e lec t ive  Attent ion
In the main, attention refers to the intensity and the distribution of an orientation 
towards a stimulus or stimuli (Bourne, Dominowski, & Loftus, 1979). As such, attention can be 
conceptualized as a process of focusing, to varying degrees of selectivity and vigilance, on one 
or more stimuli from a distribution of possible stimuli (Broadbent, 1958; Norman, 1968; 
Treisman, 1969). Because control theory is concerned with control through the selective 
processing of information (Powers, 1973), control theory places emphasis on the informative 
aspects of a specific stimulus or group of stimuli.
S e l f - fo c u s
Carver and Scheier (1981a) present an environmental/self-focus dichotomy. They 
suggest that information processing is directed towards information which originates from the 
environment or from within the person. Further, they (Carver, 1979; Carver & Scheier, 1981a, 
1981b, 1982a) posit that control at a specific level within the hierarchy of control loops 
depends in part on the person’s self-focus. Specifically, Carver and Scheier (1982a) suggest;
that directing attention to the self, when a behavioral standard has been evoked
7by the nature of one’s role or the setting, engages the comparator at the level 
of control that is superordinate. The result is a tendency to compare one’s 
perceptions of one’s present state or behavior against the standard, leading 
(when possible) to a reduction of perceptible discrepancies between the two.
(p. 144)
Support for the environment/self-focus dichotomy can be found in research by Carver 
and Scheier (1982a) and Hollenbeck and Williams (1987) which found that persons with higher 
levels of self-focus tended to seek information that facilitated the comparison process. Self­
directed attention resulted in increased comparison of a present state to a standard. Further, 
empirical evidence shows that a stronger relation between a performance standard and 
performance exists for high self-focus persons relative to those low in self-focus (Carver, 1974, 
1975; Scheier, Fenigstein, & Buss, 1974).
8Expectancy Theory
Building on earlier work by Lewin (1938), Rotter (1955), Peak (1955), Davidson, 
Suppes, and Siegel (1957), Atkinson (1958), and Tolman (1959), Vroom (1964) put forth a 
cognitive model of motivation. As noted by Vroom (1964), the model assumes "that the 
choices made by a person among alternative courses of action are lawfully related to 
psychological events occurring contemporaneously with the behavior." Essentially, Vroom 
(1964) postulated two models. One model serves to guide predictions concerning the valence 
of an outcome, the other predicts force/effort towards behavior (Messmer, Solomon, & Uddel, 
1983). However, before further elaborating on Vroom’s (1964) work, two points should be 
made.
First, numerous extensions and refinements (Campbell, Dunnette, Lawler, & Weick, 
1970; Lawler, 1971; Porter & Lawler, 1968) have been made to Vroom’s (1964) initial effort. 
However, in the absence of clear evidence to favor an alternative specification and because 
many researchers continue to find Vroom’s (1964) original model acceptable in general terms 
(Pinder, 1987), I rely on Vroom’s (1964) original model. Second, though VIE theory has 
captivated and held the attention of many researchers over the years, some doubt the 
testability, if not the viability, of the theory (Arnold, 1981; Campbell & Pritchard, 1976; Locke, 
1975; Pinder, 1977).
V a lence
According to Vroom (1964), valence refers to the orientation that a person holds 
towards an outcome. If the orientation towards a particular outcome is one of preference, it is 
said to carry a positive valence or be positively valent. Likewise, if a person’s orientation 
towards a particular outcome is one of disdain or indifference, the outcome is said to be 
negatively valent or hold zero valence, respectively, for that person (Vroom, 1964). Vroom 
(1964) stated:
It is important to distinguish between the valence of an outcome to a person
9and its value to that person. An individual may desire an object but derive little 
satisfaction from its attainment, or he may strive to avoid an object which he 
later finds to be quite satisfying. At any given time there may be a substantial 
discrepancy between the anticipated satisfaction from an outcome (i.e., its 
valence) and the actual satisfaction that it provides (e.g., its value), (p. 15)
Said another way, whereas the value of an outcome refers to the satisfaction or worth a person 
obtains from an outcome, valence refers to the satisfaction or worth a person expects to 
receive from an outcome (Pinder, 1987).
Inst rumenta l i ty
Instrumentality is an outcome-outcome association, according to Vroom (1964), "that 
can take values ranging from -1, indicating a belief that attainment of the second outcome is 
certain without the first outcome and impossible with it, to +1, indicating that the first outcome 
is believed to be a necessary and sufficient condition for the attainment of the second 
outcome." It is a probability belief which links one outcome (performance) to other outcomes 
(llgen, Nebeker, & Pritchard, 1981; Pinder, 1987).
Expectancy
Because specific outcomes attained by a person are dependent not only on the 
choices that a person makes but also on events which are beyond that person’s control, it 
seems clear that the person’s behavior is affected by preferences among a field of possible 
outcomes and the degree to which the person believes these outcomes to be probable (Vroom,
1964). Accordingly, "expectancy is an action-outcome/effort-performance (llgen, Nebeker, & 
Pritchard, 1981) association," as put forth by Vroom (1964), that "takes values ranging from 
zero, indicating no subjective probability that an act will be followed by an outcome, to 1, 
indicating certainty that the act will be followed by the outcome."
F o r c e / E f f o r t
Vroom (1964) conceptualized the motivational force, which acts on an individual, as "a
10
monotonically increasing function of the product of valence and expectancy." Thus, according 
to Vroom (1964):
An outcome with high positive or negative valence will have no effect on the 
generation of a force unless there is some expectancy (e.g., some subjective 
probability greater than zero) that the outcome will be attained by some act. As 
the strength of an expectancy that an act will lead to an outcome increases, the 
effect of variations in the valence of the outcome on the force to perform the act 
will also increase. Similarly, if the valence of an outcome is zero (e.g., the 
person is indifferent to the outcome), neither the absolute value nor variations 
in the strength of expectancies of attaining it will have any effect on forces.
(p. 19)
As stated above, motivational force, according to Vroom (1964), is the product of valence and 
expectancy. It should be noted, however, that such a representation is a simplification or 
reduction of terms, one which does not make explicit the contribution of instrumentality. In 
more explicit terms, the model, F.. = E V., where V. = l Vk, states that the motivational force (F) 
acting on an individual performer (i) to obtain a first level outcome (j) is equal to the product of 
expectancy (E)-the probability that the performer (i) will be successful in obtaining a first level 
outcome (j)--and valence (V)-the satisfaction or worth a person expects to receive from the 
first level outcome (j). Because the valence of the first level outcome (j) is the product of 
instrumentality (I), the contingent relation between a first level outcome (j) and a second level 
outcome (k), and the valence (V) of the second level outcome (k), expressed as V. = I„V.,
J J *  *
Vroom’s model (1964) may alternatively be expressed as F =£^(1 Vk).
H ie r a r c h ic a l  O rg an iza t ion
Though somewhat obvious, it is important to stress the hierarchical organization of 
Vroom’s model (1964); the relation between first-level outcomes and second-level outcomes 
through instrumentality and valence (Vroom, 1964). Because instrumentality, by definition, is
11
an index of the perceived contingency between attainment of first-level performance and 
actually receiving the associated second-level outcome, hierarchical ordering is mandated. 
The hierarchical nature of VIE theory is further evident through the contribution to the valence 
of the first-level outcome made by a second-level outcome, a multiplicative function of valence 
and instrumentality.
12
Rationale for Integrating VIE and Control Theory
The preceding sections introduced control theory and VIE theory. Building on the 
preceding, this section will provide the rationale for their integration. First, it will specify 
structural aspects common to both theories. Second, it will address substantive similarities 
evident through (a) a common focus on performance, (b) the link between control responses 
and the constituents of VIE theory, (c) goal commitment research, and (d) the feedback 
process.
Structura l  S im i la r i t ies
It should be recalled that control theory and VIE theory present hierarchical models.
Both theories recognize the influence of second level states on first level behaviors. As control
theory links first level behavior by way of the standard output from a second level loop, VIE
theory links first and second level outcomes via instrumentality and the contribution to the
valence of the first-level outcome made by a second-level outcome, a multiplicative function of
valence and instrumentality.
Further, both theories put forth process models which bear directly on performance.
Expectancy theory is fundamentally a process theory of motivation (Leon, 1981; Messmer,
Solomon, & Liddell, 1983; Sussmann & Vecchio, 1985). Likewise, when applied to human
behavior, control theory is a process theory of self-regulated performance (Campion & Lord,
1982; Carver & Scheier, 1981a; Hollenbeck & Williams, 1987; Lord, Kernan, & Hanges, 1983;
Taylor, 1983; Taylor, Fisher, & llgen, 1984).
Substant ive  Re la t ions
Beyond the structural similarities, the relation between VIE theory and control theory is
substantively evident through (a) a common focus on performance, (b) the link between
control responses and the constituents of VIE theory, (c) goal commitment research, and (d)
the feedback process. In the following, support for this substantive relation will be presented.
A discussion concerning a common focus on performance will be presented first.
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P e r fo rm an c e ,  llgen, Nebeker, and Pritchard (1981) and Mitchell (1987) posit that 
performance is primarily a function of ability and motivation. Whereas control theory describes 
the process whereby performance is self-regulated (Carver & Scheier, 1981a), VIE theory, one 
which implicitly or explicitly addresses the role of ability (Vroom, 1984; Porter & Lawler, 1968, 
respectively), describes the motivational process that underlies performance (Vroom, 1964). 
Further, the construct, effort, plays an important role in both VIE and control theory.
Contro l  respo nses  and  VIE const i tuents .  In VIE theory, Vroom’s effort model 
(Galbraith & Cummings, 1967) states that effort is equal to the product of the expectancy that 
effort leads to performance and the sum of the products of instrumentality of performance for 
the attainment of second-level outcomes and the valence of the second-level outcomes 
(Seybolt & Pavett, 1979). In control theory, changing effort is a control response fundamental 
to the control process (Campion & Lord, 1982; Hollenbeck & Williams, 1987). A second 
control response, changing the set level of the standard, provides additional support for a 
substantive relation between the two theories.
Because the human propensity to align attitudes, beliefs, and expectations with 
behavior has been well documented (Bentler & Speckart, 1979; Cooper & Fazio, 1984; 
Festinger, 1957; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), it is reasonable to propose that, by-and-large, people 
select for themselves performance outcomes that are grounded in valencies moderated by 
expectancy and instrumental probabilities. As such, the control theory process of selecting 
outcomes or standards and the second control response, changing the set level of a standard 
(Campion & Lord, 1982; Hollenbeck & Williams, 1987), may be linked to expectancy, 
instrumentality, and valence. Additional, though more circuitous, support for a substantive 
relation may be found in goal commitment research.
G oal  com m itm ent  r e s e a rc h .  Locke (1968) posited that goal commitment 
(commitment to a performance expectation), is a moderating variable in the goal setting 
process. Locke stated that people who "stop trying when confronted by a hard task (i.e., those
14
uncommitted to a goal) are people who have decided that the goal [performance expectation] 
is impossible to reach and who no longer are trying for that goal.'1 Because the extent to which 
a person will remain committed to a performance expectation may be closely related to the 
motivational force of that expectation (Locke, Shaw, Saari, & Latham, 1981), a link between the 
postulates of goal setting and expectancy theory has been suggested (Dachler & Mobley, 
1973; Dossett, Latham, & Mitchell, 1979; Kalb & Boyatzis, 1970; Mento, Cartledge, & Locke, 
1980; Oldham, 1975; Steers, 1975). Similarly, as stated by Locke, Shaw, Saari, and Latham 
(1981), "the factors that affect goal acceptance...fit easily into two major categories, which are 
the main components of expectancy theory." Because control theory has been purported to be 
an apt descriptor of the goal setting process (Campion & Lord, 1982; Hollenbeck & Williams, 
1987) and because of the relation between VIE theory and goal setting (Dachler & Mobley, 
1973; Dossett, Latham, & Mitchell, 1979; Kalb & Boyatzis, 1970; Locke, 1968; Locke, Shaw, 
Saari, & Latham, 1981; Mento, Cartledge, & Locke, 1980; Oldham, 1975; Steers, 1975), one 
may reason that expectancy theory and control theory can be effectively integrated. Additional 
support for an integrated model lies in the potentially complementary relation between VIE and 
control systems theory.
F e e d b a c k .  Fundamental to control theory is the notion of feedback. Though it may 
be difficult to envision expectancy theory in the absence of feedback, expectancy theory 
(Vroom, 1964) does not explicitly address feedback. As noted by Seyboltand Pavett (1979): 
Hypothetically, the individual should use whatever feedback is available as he 
formulates his motivation force to perform. Moreover, feedback should 
specifically influence the individual’s instrumentality and expectancy by giving 
him additional information to facilitate his examination of these parameters.
(p. 93)
Research by Seybolt and Pavett (1979) supports this position when effort is calculated in 
accord with Vroom’s effort model. Likewise, implied in control theory is the notion of an
15
impetus.
Though the control theory model is useful in portraying the application of control 
responses to self-regulated behavior, the impetus for such control is less than explicit. When 
taken together, control theory may make a contribution to expectancy theory through explicit 
recognition of the role of feedback, and expectancy theory may contribute to our 
understanding of the process by which feedback provides the impetus to mediate control.
16
A Proposed VIE-Control Systems Model
The immediately preceding section presented the rationale for integrating VIE theory 
and control theory. Given this rationale, this section will present the principal aspects of that 
integration. It will specify how we select a standard of performance, the types of control 
responses we employ, the role of feedback in the control process, the temporal relation 
between control responses, and the role of individual differences in the attentional process. 
S e lec t io n  of a P e r fo r m a n c e  S tand ard
As previously mentioned, the VIE model (Vroom, 1964) is useful in predicting the effort 
that a performer will put forth. It can make such predictions because it represents the force 
that a potential outcome exerts on the performer. According to Vroom (1964), the greater the 
force, the greater the effort. More important, the VIE model is useful because it specifies the 
elements that contribute to the force acting on the performer and the relative contribution 
made by each element.
Outcome valences and outcome expectancies exert control over behavior because 
they signal the probability of reinforcement and provide an estimate of the reinforcer’s 
magnitude. As such, both carry information that directs the performer’s attention and the 
performer’s behavior. Thus, the outcome that exerts the greatest force on the performer is the 
outcome to which the performer selectively attends, the performance standard. For example, 
the potential control of a course grade-outcome of "B" on a performer, the force (F^) acting on 
the performer (i) to obtain a course grade of "B" (k), is the product of the performer’s subjective 
probability estimate of obtaining a course grade of "B" (k) and the satisfaction or worth (V) that 
the performer expects to derive from the course grade.
In sum, the standard to which a performer selectively attends is a function of the 
product of information concerning the valence and the expectancy of the outcome. Given that 
the magnitude of the outcome valence-expectancy product can vary and that greater outcome 
valence-expectancy products exert greater force on the performer, the integrated model
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suggests that performers select the outcome carrying the highest motivational force as their 
standard.
Contro l  S t ra teg ies
The integrated model is useful in predicting control responses and the conditions of 
their application. It was stated that performers evoke control responses, cognitive or 
behavioral, to minimize performance-standard discrepancies. It was also stated that the 
standard to which a performer selectively attends is a function of the product of the information 
concerning the outcome’s valence and the outcome’s expectancy. Performers select as their 
performance standard the outcome carrying the highest motivational force. Thus, it follows 
that in the presence of a performance-standard disparity, when the motivational force of the 
standard is no longer sufficient to compel performance consistent with the standard, the 
performer will employ a cognitive control response, i.e, change the standard. The performer’s 
attention will be selectively diverted from the prior standard to the standard that currently 
carries the highest motivational force. In contrast, when the motivational force of the focal 
standard remains prepotent in the presence of a performance-standard disparity, the performer 
will employ a behavioral control response, i.e., change the effort. Faced with the possibility of 
failing to reach the standard, given its high motivational force, the performer will intensify goal 
directed behaviors.
The Role  of F e e d b a c k  in the Contro l  P ro c e s s
Consistent with control theory, the integrated model acknowledges the application of 
control responses to minimize differences between the performance and the standard 
(Campion & Lord, 1982; Harrison, Klawsky, Suh, & Shanahan, 1989). Further, it suggests that 
feedback loops arise from the application of the control response employed to minimize such 
deficiencies. As will be shown, this relation manifests itself through changes in the standard 
and changes in effort.
Changing the standard serves to minimize differences between the performance and
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the standard. When applied, a negative feedback loop results. For example, students who 
have selected a course grade of "B" as their focal standard, could opt for a course grade of "C" 
to bring the standard in line with the performance.
In lieu of changing the focal standard, increasing effort, a maximizing deviation control 
strategy, can be applied to subordinate outcomes that link to the focal standard. When 
applied, a positive feedback loop results. In contrast to the negative feedback loop at the 
superordinate level, which serves to bring the focal standard in line with performance, the 
positive feedback loop at the subordinate level serves to bring performance in line with the 
focal standard. For example, students who have as their standard a course grade-outcome of 
"B“ and who obtain a test grade of "C", could endeavor to raise future test performance 
expectations.
Tem pora l  Re la t ion  Among Contro l  Responses
Based on research by Harrison et al. (1989), the integrated model posits that the 
choice of the control response systematically varies with temporal changes in the performance 
process. Because a change in effort does not require the abandonment of preferred outcomes 
and, in fact, may facilitate acquisition of those outcomes, it follows that effort changes will more 
frequently be applied in the earlier stages of the performance process. However, as time 
continues and our probability estimates decline, a cognitive response would be expected to 
reduce the impending disparity. Thus, changes in effort will more frequently be chosen to 
remediate performance-standard disparities in the earlier stages of the performance process, 
whereas changes in standard will more frequently be chosen in the later stages.
In d iv id u a l  D i f f e r e n c e s  in the At ten t ions I  P ro c ess
The perceptual process is believed to depend on the comparison of stimuli to 
standards held in recognitory structures (Neisser, 1976), the environment in which perceptions 
occur. Such aside, Duval and Wicklund (1972) present an environmental-self-focus attentional 
dichotomy. Though they do not take exception to the monistic view put forth by Nieser (1976),
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they assert that a dualistic perspective is useful in explicating individual differences in the 
attentional process. They posit that a performer’s attention may be directed to the environment 
or to the self. As noted by Carver and Scheier (1981a), this dichotomy has been shown to be 
useful because persons high in self-focus tend to seek information that facilitates the 
comparison process (Carver, 1974, 1975; Carver & Scheier, 1982a; Scheier, Fenigstein, & 
Buss, 1974). Thus, the integrated model suggests that self-focus serves to moderate the 
performance-standard relation; persons high in self-focus are therefore expected to manifest 
smaller performance-standard disparities than performers low in self-focus.
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Discussion of the Campion and Lord Study and Contributions of the 
Integrated Model
Having specified the principal aspects of the integrated model, this section will 
highlight questions that arise from the Campion and Lord (1982) study and the contributions 
that follow from the integration of VIE theory and control theory.
Though the control theory model put forth by Campion and Lord (1982) provides a 
framework to conceptualize the goal setting process, many questions important to goal setting 
are left unanswered. Though control theory assumes that performers have a standard of 
performance, it provides no information regarding the origin of that standard. It does not tell us 
how we select our standards of performance. It does not explain why some performers select 
standards so high and others so low. And it does not contribute to our understanding of 
commitment. Why, in the face of adversity, do some remain committed while others are quick 
to abandon their goals. A control theory model tells us only that in the face of a performance- 
standard disparity we will evoke a control response. It does not even specify which control 
response will be applied.
In contrast, the integrated model specifies that we select for ourselves standards of 
performance, based on the satisfaction or the worth (valence) that we believe will follow from 
outcomes and our estimate of the probability (expectancy) that these outcomes are 
achievable. It posits that the potential of outcomes, through the multiplicative combination of 
valence and expectancy as a motivational force (Vroom, 1964), serves to compel goal directed 
behavior.
The integrated model further specifies that in the presence of a performance-standard 
disparity, when the motivational force of the standard is no longer sufficient to compel 
performance consistent with the standard, the performer will employ a cognitive control 
response, i.e, change the standard. In contrast, when the motivational force of the focal 
standard remains prepotent in the presence of a performance-standard disparity, the performer
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will employ a behavioral control response, i.e., change the effort.
Additionally, the integrated model specifies the temporal relation between cognitive 
and behavioral control responses. Because a change in effort does not require us to abandon 
our preferred outcomes and, in fact, may facilitate acquisition of those outcomes, it follows that 
effort changes will more frequently be applied in the earlier stages of the performance process. 
However, as time continues and our probability estimates decline, a cognitive response would 
be expected to reduce the impending disparity.
Finally, the integrated model acknowledges individual differences. Though all 
individuals seek information from their environment, individuals differ in the type of information 
and in the amount of information they seek. Individuals high in self-focus seek more 
information from their environment to facilitate the comparison process relative to that sought 
by persons low in self-focus. Based on such, the integrated model posits that performance- 
standard disparities will be less for performers high in self-focus than for performers low in self­
focus.
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Hypotheses
As it may be recalled, I began our overview of this research with an introduction to VIE 
and control theory. I followed that introduction with the rationale for integrating VIE and 
control theory and presented a model of that integration. In the immediately preceding 
section, I showed the applicability of the integrated model to questions, important to the goal 
setting process, which arose from the Campion and Lord study (1982). Given the foregoing, 
this section will specify the 6 hypotheses that follow from the integrated model.
H ypothes is  1
The outcome carrying the highest motivational force, calculated as F.j = EjjV., where 
V = I 'V., will be selected as the focal standard.
J J *  *
Hypothes is  2
When the focal standard and performance are disparate, the performer will elect to 
either increase effort or change the focal standard.
Hypothes is  3
When the focal standard and performance are disparate and the motivational force of 
the focal standard is no longer sufficient to elicit performance consistent with the standard, the 
performer will elect to change the focal standard.
Hypothes is  4
Performers will more frequently apply effort change to ameliorate performance- 
standard disparities when the motivational force of the focal standard remains prepotent than 
when the motivational force of the focal standard does not remain prepotent.
Hypothes is  5
Performers will more frequently rely on changes in effort to remediate a performance- 
standard disparity in the earlier stages of the performance process and will increasingly rely on 
changes to the focal standard in later stages of this process.
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Hypothes is  6
The relation between the motivational force of potential standards (F|j = E..Vjl where 
V = ljV k), and the prioritization of potential standards will be stronger for persons high in self­
focus than for persons low in self-focus.
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Method
Overv iew
The hypotheses derived from the integrated model were tested on a sample of students 
enrolled in Psychology 101, in which four 50-item multiple choice tests were administered as 
part of the course requirements. At the beginning of the course, prior to the first course 
examination, subjects were asked to complete a Pre-Test Questionnaire calling for 
demographic information, information concerning course performance expectations, and 
study (effort) intentions. Included as part of the Pre-Test Questionnaire, subjects completed 
the Self-Consciousness Scale developed by Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss (1975) and a 9-item 
anxiety scale modeled after Spielberger’s (1971) State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. They were also 
asked to complete a rating Questionnaire (VIE component measures) directed at measuring 
the expectancy and valence of course grade outcomes. Following each of the first three 
examinations, a Post-Test/Pre-Test Questionnaire was administered to all subjects. The Post- 
Test/Pre-Test questionnaire asked subjects to report the performance they obtained on their 
last examination, to indicate the effort that contributed to their performance and, once again, 
to indicate their study intentions. They were also asked, again, to complete the Rating 
Questionnaire (VIE component measures).
S u b je c ts
Two hundred and forty subjects were initially drawn from a population of 
undergraduate students, enrolled in Psychology 101, who volunteered to participate in a study 
of self-regulated human performance. Students were given the opportunity to volunteer 
through sign-up sheets posted on bulletin boards in appropriate areas of UNO, Arts and 
Sciences Hall, and announcements were made at Psychology 101 lectures and discussion 
sections. Of this initial sample, 34 subjects (14%) failed to complete all four examinations, 
resulting in a terminal sample of 206 subjects.
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ins t rum ents  an d  M e a s u r e s
Three questionnaires were used to collect all data, perceptual and behavioral. These 
included (a) the Rating Questionnaire (Appendix B), (b) the Pre-Test Questionnaire (Appendix 
C), and (c) the Post-Test/Pre-Test Questionnaire (Appendix D).
The ra t in g  ques t ionna ire .  The Rating Questionnaire was used to collect subjects’ 
expectancy and primary valence ratings of potential course grades. Because this study was 
not directly interested in the instrumental relation between course grades and grade point 
average or other higher level outcomes, measures of instrumentality were not solicited. The 
valence of each outcome was measured by importance ratings, provided by subjects, on a 
scale ranging from -4 to +4. Verbal anchors ranged from "It is extremely important that I obtain 
this outcome," through "It makes no difference whether or not I obtain or avoid this outcome," 
to "It is extremely important that I avoid this outcome."
Expectancy was measured through subjects’ probability ratings, expressed as a 
percent (0% to 100%), that the combination of their ability and their effort would result in a 
particular level of grade performance in the course. The decision to rate expectancy as a 
probability was based on Vroom’s (1964) conceptualization of expectancy as that which "takes 
values ranging from zero...to +1."
The p r e - te s t  que s t ionna ire .  The Pre-Test Questionnaire called for such 
demographic information as ID number, age, gender, major, and college status. It asked 
subjects to list their course grade expectations and their study intentions. It also asked 
subjects to rank order the 9 performance outcomes with regard to priority (e.g., goal, 
expectation, intention, etc.). In addition, the Pre-Test Questionnaire included a 9-item anxiety 
scale modeled after Spielberger’s (1971) State-Trait Anxiety Inventory and a 17-item measure 
of seif-focus developed by Fenigstein et al. (1975). This measure, called the Self- 
Consciousness Scale, "attempts to tap dispositional differences in the degree to which 
individuals’ primary focus of attention is the self, rather than the environment (Hollenbeck &
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Williams, 1987)."
The s e l f -c o n s c io u s n e s s  sca le .  Though research by Fenigstein et al. (1975) 
suggested a two dimensional measure, private and public self-consciousness, in other studies 
(Hollenbeck & Williams, 1987), the subscales were found to be more highly correlated (r = .67) 
than items within the scale; principle components factor analysis failed to support a two-factor 
structure. Within the context of a unidimensional measure, the internal consistency estimate of 
reliability was .78 (Hollenbeck & Williams, 1987).
Turner, Scheier, Carver, and Ickes (1978) found the Self-Consciousness Scale to be 
significantly correlated (r = .40) with the Guilford-Zimmerman Thoughtfulness Scale and the 
Pavio Imagery Inventory. It was also found by Glass (1976) to correlate significantly with self­
monitoring (Snyder, 1974).
In contrast, measures of social desirability (Crown & Marlow, 1964), self-esteem 
(Morse & Gergen, 1970), and emotionality (Buss & Plomin, 1975) were found by Turner et al. 
(1978) to not relate significantly to the Self-Consciousness Scale. Measures of IQ (Otis, 1954), 
need for achievement (Edwards, 1957), test anxiety (Mandler & Sarason, 1952), and impulsivity 
(Buss & Plomin, 1975) were, likewise, found by Carver and Glass (1976) to be uncorrelated 
with the scale.
The p o s t - t e s t / p r e - t e s t  ques t ionna ire .  In addition to the topics covered by the 
Pre-Test Questionnaire, the Post-Test/Pre-Test Questionnaire asked subjects to report the 
grade they received on their last test and provide two separate ratings to indicate the amount of 
effort they intended to spend in preparation for the next exam as compared to the last exam. 
The first rating used a scale from 1 to 5, with verbal anchors ranging from "much less" through 
"about the same" to "much more." The second rating used a scale from 1 to 7, with verbal 
anchors ranging from "much less" through "about the same" to "extraordinarily more."
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P re -a d m in is t ra t io n  test of  m easures .  A sample of 60 subjects was drawn to 
test the readability of the questionnaires and to collect data from which reliability coefficients 
could be generated. Though it was anticipated that subjects’ ratings of valence, 
instrumentality, and expectancy were subject to change over time, it was expected that the 
ratings would be relatively free from wild undulation over a relatively short period of time (De 
Leo & Pritchard, 1981; llgen, Nebeker, & Pritchard, 1974). Thus, stability coefficients were 
calculated to serve as estimates of reliability. Two test-retest intervals were used, 24 hours and 
72 hours. Readability was assessed through interviews included as part of the debriefing 
procedure following the administration of all remaining questionnaires.
P r o c e d u r e
Two weeks after beginning the semester, time 1, subjects were randomly assigned to 
two groups to facilitate alternating the order in which Pre-Test and Rating Questionnaires were 
presented. At that time, group 1 subjects were asked to first complete the Pre-Test 
Questionnaire and then to complete the Rating Questionnaire. In contrast, group 2 subjects 
were asked to first complete the Rating Questionnaire and then to complete the Pre-Test 
Questionnaire.
At time 2, time 3, and time 4, one week following the first exam, the second exam, and 
the third exam, respectively, subjects were asked to once again complete the Rating 
Questionnaire and to complete the Post-Test/Pre-Test Questionnaire. For all subjects, order of 
presentation (of questionnaires) was alternated from that of the previous administration.
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Results
All data entries were verified three times and corrections to input errors were made. 
Though all measures were self-report, grade outcomes were verified against grade reports 
furnished by the course instructor. Errors were uncommon; over 95% of the subjects reported 
accurately the grades they received. When errors were detected, corrections were made, and 
the data were retained. Though subjects may have been excluded from a particular analysis 
because of missing data, they were not dropped from the study. Thus, the number of subjects 
in an analysis sometimes exceeded the number of subjects in a preceding analysis. 
Descriptive grade-goal data are provided in Appendix A.
R el iab i l i ty
The test-retest method was used to estimate the reliability of questionnaires applied in 
this study. Two retest intervals were used: twenty-four hours and seventy-two hours. As noted 
in Table 1, the analyses suggested that responses provided by subjects were quite consistent 
over time. Reliability coefficients obtained at time 1 -2 did not differ from those obtained at time 
1-3, r yi# = .85; r =.85. Probability estimates-subjects’ estimates of the probability that they 
would obtain a specific grade-outcome (A + to F)-showed the most stability, r = .985. In 
contrast, importance ratings-subjects’ estimates of the importance of obtaining a specific 
grade-outcome (A + to F)-showed the least stability, r = .73.
Hypothesis  1
The standard carrying the highest motivational force, calculated as F =E V , will be
J  ^  ^  IK IK K
selected as the focal standard.
Data  ana lys is  and  results .  Hypothesis 1 was analyzed in three ways. The first 
assessed the strength of the relation between grade goal and motivational force through a 
mean within-subjects correlation coefficient. A correlation coefficient was calculated, for each 
subject, to assess the strength of the relation between the subject’s top four grade goals and
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Table 1.
C o e f f ic ien ts  of  S tab i l i ty  Based  on a Twenty-Four  and  Seventy-Two Hour  Retest  
in terva l .
Response
Items
Coefficient 
Time 1-2 
(n = 60)
Coefficient 
Time 1-3 
(n = 60)
Mean
Coefficient
AH .85 .85 .850
Anxiety .87 .86 .865
Goal .87 .79 .830
Importance .76 .70 .730
Probability .98 .99 .985
Self-Focus .79 .80 .795
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their corresponding motivational force. Following this procedure, each correlation was 
transformed to a Fisher-Z score to normalize the distribution, and the mean correlation was 
calculated. The obtained mean within-subjects correlation was r(n = 240) = .72 (z = .90348). 
Note, however, that the obtained correlation understates the strength of the relation between 
grade goal selection and motivational force due to the unreliability of the measures.
To obtain a more accurate estimate of this relation, the obtained mean within-subjects 
correlation was corrected for unreliability. Correcting for unreliability in the predictor, 
motivational force estimates (rT13 = .85), and in the criterion, grade goal (rT13 = .79), over 77% 
of the variance in goal selection was accounted for by motivational force; rcrt,d = .88.
Second, because subject’s ability or willingness to prioritize potential outcomes may 
have weakened as outcomes became less probable, another test of hypothesis 1 was 
conducted. This test examined, at times 1 , 2 , 3  and 4, the proportion of subjects who selected 
the outcome carrying the highest motivational force as their number one grade goal.
Because the null hypothesis predicted no relation between motivational force and 
selection of a performance standard, it followed that each of the 9 course grades, A+ to F, had 
an equal probability of being selected as the focal standard. Given such and that subject’s 
responses were dichotomized, select/do not select, Chi-Square tests were conducted with 
expected cell frequencies of 1:8. Before presenting the results of those analyses for all time 
periods, a more detailed explanation, using time 1 only, may be helpful.
Based on the data for time 1 and an expected cell frequency ratio of 1:8, we expect that 
26 subjects would select the outcome carrying the highest motivational force (HMF) as their 
number one grade goal and that 204 would not. The results indicated that 99 subjects selected 
the outcome carrying the HMF as their number one goal; in contrast, 131 subjects did not. A 
Chi-Square test indicated that the obtained distribution was significantly different than that 
predicted by the null hypothesis, X2(1) = 231.08, p<  .002. In other words, more subjects 
selected, at time 1, the outcome carrying the highest motivational force (HMF) as their number
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one goal than would be expected to occur by chance.
Chi-Square Test for Time 1
select did not select 
as standard as standard
ef=26 ef=204
HMF of=99 of=131
Note. ef = expected cell frequency 
of = obtained cell frequency
Overall (across times one, two, three, and four), motivational force predicted subjects’ 
number one grade goal 45% of the time (Table 2).
To further examine the relation between motivational force and goal selection, a third 
analysis was undertaken to determine if a selection pattern, as found for goal one, similarly 
existed for goals two, three, and four. This test was conducted in the same manner as was the 
preceding analysis, a Chi-Square test with an expected cell frequency ratio of 1:8. Unlike the 
preceding test, however, which examined the relation between selection as the number one 
grade goal and its corresponding motivational force, this test examined the relation between 
selection as the number two grade goal, the number three grade goal, the number four grade 
goal and its corresponding motivational force. The results revealed that, on the average, thirty- 
six percent of the time, motivational force estimates predicted goal choice (Table 2). 
Hypothes is  2
When the focal standard and performance are disparate, the performer will elect to 
either increase effort or change the focal standard.
Data ana lys is  and  results .  Subjects’ data were analyzed in the context of 2 x 2 
contingency tables with expected cell frequencies set by the marginals. To avoid violation of 
the assumption of independence of observations, three 2 x 2  contingency tables were 
constructed, one for time 1, one for time 2, and one for time 3. The results revealed that for
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Table 2.
M ot iva t iona l  Fo rce -G oa l  Compar isons :  Num be r  of  Sub jec ts  Whose G rade-Goa l  
C o rres p o n d e d  With Its M o t iva t iona l  Force.
Goal Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Time 4
(n = 230) (n = 235) (n = 219) (n = 206)
1 99 (43%) 101 (43%) 99 (45%) 103 (50%)
2 87 (38%) 85 (36%) 83 (38%) 85(41%)
3 71 (31%) 82 (35%) 81 (37%) 85 (41%)
4 51 (22%)* 82 (35%) 81 (37%) 85 (41%)
Note.  All percentages, except for goal # 4  at time 1 (*), were significant, p < .002
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each time period, subjects more frequently made control responses in the presence of a 
performance-standard disparity than in the presence of performance-standard congruence 
(Table 3). For example, at time 1, 79% of the subjects who experienced a performance- 
standard disparity employed a control response (change of effort or change of standard). In 
contrast, 55% of the subjects who obtained their preferred outcome made a control response, 
X2(1) = 6.39, p<.01.
When averaged across all time periods, 73% of the time, subjects who experienced a 
performance-standard disparity employed a control response (change of effort or change of 
standard) (Table 3). A breakdown of the direction of the disparity, type of control response, 
and direction of the control response is provided in Table 4. In contrast, 31% of the time, 
subjects who obtained their preferred outcome made a control response (Table 3). Of the 
31% who made a control response, having obtained their preferred outcome, 40% lowered 
their standard, 4% increased their standard, 35% increased their effort, 17% decreased their 
effort, and 4% lowered their standard while increasing their effort.
Hypothes is  3
When the focal standard and performance are disparate and the motivational force of 
the focal standard is no longer sufficient to elicit performance consistent with the standard, the 
performer will elect to change the focal standard.
Data ana lys is  and  resu l ts .  Hypothesis 3 was analyzed in two ways. First, r-tests 
were conducted to compare, in the presence of a performance-standard disparity, the standard 
change when the motivational force of the standard remained prepotent-carried the highest 
motivational fo rce -to  the standard change when the motivational force of the standard no 
longer remained prepotent.
The results revealed that subjects made significantly greater changes to their focal 
standard in the presence of a performance-standard disparity when the motivational force of 
that standard was no longer prepotent than when the motivational force remained prepotent
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Table 3.
Contro l  Response Compar isons :  Pe rcen tage  o f  Sub jec ts  Who Employed a Contro l  
Stra tegy or Who D id  Not  Employ a Con tro l  S t rategy  in the P resence  of  
Per fo rm an ce -S ta nda rd  C o ng ruence  or Dispar i ty .
Group NoCR CR
Disparate (Across All Time Periods) 27% 73%
Time Period 1-2 (N =191) 21% 79%
Time Period 2-3 (N = 180) 30% 70%
Time Period 3-4 (N = 165) 32% 68%
Congruent (Across All Time Periods) 69% 31%
Time Period 1-2 (N = 28) 45% 55%
Time Period 2-3 (N = 22) 81% 19%
Time Period 3-4 (N = 24) 83% 17%
Note.  Time 1, p < .01; time 2 and time 3, p < .001
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Table 4.
D i re c t io n  o f  the P e r fo rm ance -S tanda rd  D ispar i ty  and Cho ice  o f  Con t ro l  Response  
f o r  Pe rsons  Who Made a Contro l  Response in the P resence  of  a P e r fo rm ance -  
Standard  Dispar i ty,  Ac ross  Ai l  Time Per iods.
Disparity n Type/Direction 
of Control Response
Obtained More 5 Raised Standard
Than Expected 1 Raised Standard and Effort
(2%) 2 Lowered Standard.
Obtained Less 5 Raised Standard
Than Expected 53 Lowered Standard
(98%) 198 Raised Effort
15 Lowered Effort
110 Raised Standard and Effort
2 Lowered Goal and Effort
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(Table 5). For example, when the focal standard at time 3 was no longer prepotent at time 4, 
the mean change to the standard (time 3 - time 4), in the presence of a performance-standard 
disparity, was 0.61 (1.00 is equal to a one-half grade change). In contrast, when the focal 
standard at time 3 was also prepotent at time 4, the mean change to the focal standard (time 3 - 
time 4), was 0.16, f(161) = 3.92, p < .002.
To further examine this hypothesis, a Chi-Square test was conducted in the context of a 
2 x 2  contingency table with expected cell frequencies set by the marginals. Within the group 
of subjects who experienced a performance-standard disparity, the number of subjects who 
changed their standard when the motivational force of the standard did not remain prepotent 
was compared to the number of subjects who changed their standard when the motivational 
force of the standard remained prepotent. As shown in Table 6, for times 1-2, 2-3, and 3-4, 
subjects seldom made standard changes when the motivational force of the standard remained 
prepotent. However, when the motivational force of the standard was no longer prepotent, 
subjects more frequently made changes to their standard (Table 6). For example, in the 
presence of a performance-standard disparity, when the focal standard at time 3 was no longer 
prepotent at time 4, 49 subjects changed their standard and 54 subjects did not. In contrast, 
when the focal standard at time 3 was also prepotent at time 4, 7 subjects changed their 
standard and 53 subjects did not, X2( 1) = 21.67, p < .001.
It should be noted that many subjects did not change their standard when the 
motivational force of the standard no longer remained prepotent. Because such a finding was 
not expected in light of the hypothesis, further r-test analyses were conducted to identify a 
possible moderator. The results revealed that subjects for whom the motivational force of the 
standard no longer remained prepotent did not significantly differ in self-focus, anxiety, or the 
amount of change in motivational force from subjects for whom the motivational force of the 
standard remained prepotent; a moderator was not found.
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Table 5.
Mean Change to the Foca l  S tandard  in the P resence  of  a P e r fo rm ance -S tanda rd  
Dispar i ty  fo r  Times 1-2, 2-3, and 3-4.
Group Time 1-2 
Mean Change 
(n = 187)
Time 2-3 
Mean Change 
(n = 179)
Time 3-4 
Mean Chang 
(n = 163)
Disparate & 0.65 0.56 0.61
Not Prepotent (n = 136) (n = 125) (n = 103)
Disparate & 0.09 0.16 0.16
Prepotent (n = 51) (n = 54)
o'CDnc
Note.  For each time period, p < .002.
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Table 6.
Percen tage  of  Sub jec ts  Who Made a S tandard  Change, in the P resence  of  
P e r fo rm ance -S tanda rd  Dispar i ty ,  When the M ot iva t iona l  Force  of  the Foca l  
Standard  Remained Prepo ten t  and When the M ot iva t iona l  Force  o f  the Foca l  
Standard  No L on ge r  Remained Prepotent,  f o r  Times 1-2, 2-3, and 3-4.
Time n Group Change No Change
1-2 136
51
Disparate & 
Not Prepotent 
Disparate & 
Prepotent
41%
(n = 56) 
8%
(n = 4)
59% 
(n = 80) 
92% 
(n = 47)
187 (Total N for Time 1 -2)
2-3 125
54
Disparate & 
Not Prepotent 
Disparate & 
Prepotent
41% 
(n = 51) 
13% 
(n = 7)
59% 
(n = 74) 
87% 
(n = 47)
179 (Total N for Time 2-3)
3-4 103 Disparate & 
Not Prepotent
48% 
(n = 49)
52% 
(n = 54)
60 Disparate & 
Prepotent
12% 
(n = 7)
88% 
(n = 53)
163 (Total N for Time 3-4)
Note.  For each time period, p < .001.
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Hypothes is  4
Performers will more frequently apply effort change to ameliorate performance- 
standard disparities when the motivational force of the focal standard remains prepotent than 
when the motivational force of the focal standard does not remain prepotent.
Data ana lys is  and  results .  Hypothesis 4 was analyzed in two ways. First, f-tests 
were conducted to compare, in the presence of a performance-standard disparity, the effort 
change when the motivational force of the standard remained prepotent to the effort change 
when the motivational force of the standard no longer remained prepotent, for time 2-3 and for 
time 3-4.
The results revealed that, at time 2-3, subjects made significantly greater changes in 
effort in the presence of a performance-standard disparity when the motivational force of the 
standard was prepotent than when the motivational force of the standard was no longer 
prepotent, /(177) = 1.71, p < .02 (Table 7). However, at time 3-4, this effect was, at best, 
marginal, /(161) = 1.41, p = .12.
To further examine this hypothesis, a Chi-Square test was conducted in the context of a 
2 x 2  contingency table with expected cell frequencies set by the marginals. Within the group 
of subjects who experienced a performance-standard disparity, the number of subjects who 
changed their effort when the motivational force of the standard remained prepotent was 
compared to the number of subjects who changed their effort when the motivational force of 
the standard was no longer prepotent. For example, in the presence of a performance- 
standard disparity at time 2-3 (Table 8), 46 subjects changed their effort and 79 did not, when 
the motivational force of the standard no longer remained prepotent. In contrast, when the 
motivational force of the standard remained prepotent, 40 subjects changed their effort and 14 
did not, X2( 1) = 20.98, p  < .001.
As shown in Table 8, for time 2-3 and 3-4, subjects made significantly more effort 
changes when the motivational force of the standard remained prepotent than when it did not.
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Table 7.
Mean Ef fo r t  Change in the Presence  of  a P e r fo rm ance -S tanda rd  D ispar i t y  fo r  
Times 2-3 and 3-4.
Group Time 2-3 Time 3-4
Mean Change Mean Change
(n = 179) (n = 163)
Disparate & 0.36 0.38
Not Prepotent (n = 125) (n = 103)
Disparate & 0.46 0.48
Prepotent (n = 54) oCOIIc
Note.  For time 2-3, p < .02; for time 3-4, p = . 12.
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Table 8.
Percen tage  of  S ub jec ts  Who Made an Ef fo r t  Change, in the Presence  o f  a 
P e r fo rm an ce -S ta nda rd  Dispar i ty ,  When the M ot iva t iona l  Fo rce  of  the Foca l  
Standard  Remained  Prepo ten t  and When the M ot iva t iona l  Fo rce  o f  the Foca l  
Standard  No Lon g e r  Remained  Prepotent,  fo r  Times 2-3 and  3-4,
Time n Group Change No Change
2-3 125 Disparate & 
Not Prepotent
37% 
(n = 46)
63% 
(n = 79)
54 Disparate & 
Prepotent
74% 
(n = 40)
26% 
(n = 14)
179 (Total N for Time 2-3)
3-4 103 Disparate & 
Not Prepotent
36% 
(n = 37)
64% 
(n = 66)
60 Disparate & 
Prepotent
75% 
(n = 45)
25% 
(n = 15)
163 (Total N for Time 3-4)
Note.  For each time period, p < .001.
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However, as reflected in Table 6, time 3-4, subjects demonstrated considerable variability in 
the magnitude of such changes.
Hypothes is  5
Performers will more frequently rely on changes in effort to remediate a performance- 
standard disparity in the earlier stages of the performance process and will increasingly rely 
on changes in the focal standard in later stages of this process.
Data  ana lys is  and  results .  For this hypothesis, data from subjects who made a 
control response in the presence of a performance-standard disparity were analyzed. To view 
these control behaviors over time, the analysis was conducted in the context of a 2 x 2 
contingency table, a comparison of the standard change occurring at time 1 -2 to that occurring 
at time 3-4. As reflected in Table 9, at time 1-2, 127 subjects changed their standard and 60 
subjects did not. In contrast, at time 3-4, 107 subjects changed their standard and 56 subjects 
did not. The ratio of subjects who made a standard change to those who did not at time 1-2 
was not significantly different than that same ratio at time 3-4, X2(1) = .21, ns.
Hypothes is  6
The relation between the motivational force of potential standards (F =E V ) and the1 '  IK IK K7
prioritization of potential standards will be stronger for persons high in seif-focus than for 
persons low in self-focus.
Data ana lys is  and  resul ts .  Subjects’ data were dichotomized based on the mean 
of the self-focus scores for all subjects. With an overall self-focus-score mean of 42.22 
(SD = 7.67; S£ = 0.52), subjects with self-focus scores greater than 42.22 were designated the 
high self-focus group. In contrast, subjects with self-focus scores less than 42.22 were 
designated the low self-focus group. For both groups, a correlation coefficient was calculated, 
for each subject, to assess the strength of the relation between each subject’s top four grade 
goals and their corresponding motivational force. Following this procedure, each correlation 
was transformed to a Fisher-Z score to normalize the distribution, and a mean correlation
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Table 9.
Standard  Change Compar isons :  Pe rcen tage  of  Sub jec ts  Who Changed Their
Standard,  in the P resence  of  a Pe r fo rm an ce -S ta nda rd  Dispar i ty,  fo r  Times 1-2 and  
3-4.
Time Period Change No Change
Standard Standard
Time 1-2 (n = 187) 68% 32%
Time 3-4 (n = 163) 66% 34%
Note, p > . 10
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was calculated for each group and for both groups combined. The combined mean correlation 
was r  = .90 (SD = 1.09; SE = .07). The analyses indicated that the obtained mean within- 
subjects correlation for high self-focus subjects was not significantly different from that 
obtained for low self-focus subjects (Table 10). Likewise, when Z-scores for all subjects were 
regressed on self-focus scores, no relation was found, r(n = 230) = -.05, ns.
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Table 10.
Se lf -Focus  Compar isons :  Mean W ith in -Sub jec t  M o t iva t ion a l  F o r c e / G o a l  Cho ice  
Corre la t ions  fo r  H igh  and Low Se lf -Focus  S c o r ing  Sub jec ts  .
Group Z-Score Mean-r
LoSF (n = 104) .88 .71
HiSF (n = 126) .93 .73
Note.  No significant difference between groups.
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Discussion
It may be recalled that though research by Campion and Lord (1982) suggested that 
the control systems model was an apt descriptor of the goal setting process, their research left 
several questions unanswered. First, their research did not specify the process performers use 
to select their standards: why some performers set their standards of performance so high 
while others set them so low. Second, their research did not explain the goal commitment 
process: why some remain committed to their goals while others quickly abandon their goals. 
Third, though their research found that in the presence of a performance-standard disparity, 
performers evoke a control response, either behavioral or cognitive, it did not specify the 
conditions under which these control responses were applied. To address the aforementioned, 
thus further specifying the control process, research was conducted to test a model of human 
performance: the integration of VIE and control systems theory. The following will discuss the 
results of that investigation, the implications, and directions for further research.
The results of this study clearly suggest that the structural similarities and the 
substantive relations common to VIE theory and control theory are more than fortuitous. 
Though hypotheses five and six were not supported, hypotheses one through four provide the 
strong evidence essential to the integration of VIE and control systems theory.
Hypothesis 1 suggested that we select for ourselves, standards of performance based 
on the satisfaction or the worth (valence) that we believe will follow from outcomes and our 
estimate of the probability (expectancy) that these outcomes are achievable. It posited that the 
standard carrying the highest motivational force, calculated as Fjk = E.kVk, will be selected as the 
focal standard. The results of this study revealed that when corrections were made for 
unreliability in the predictor and in the criterion, over 77% of the variance in goal selection was 
accounted for by motivational force and that subjects selected the outcome carrying the 
highest motivational force as their number one grade goal 45% of the time. However, given the 
strong correlation between goal selection and motivational force, rcrt.d = ,88, the finding that
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subjects selected the outcome carrying the highest motivational force as their number one goal 
45% of the time may be less than satisfying. It should be noted, however, that the former 
statistic reflects corrections for unreliability whereas the latter does not. In the absence of such 
corrections, the variance in goal selection accounted for by motivational force was 52%. Such 
aside, it should also be noted that individuals may differ in the importance they attach to 
valence and to expectancy estimates. Though the Vroom (1964) effort model suggests that the 
force acting on an individual is the multiplicative combination of valence and expectancy 
estimates, it is possible that individuals differ in the way they combine such information. For 
some, the combination may be as suggested by Vroom (1964). That is, regardless of the 
position a valence or an expectancy rating holds relative to their respective scales, the 
motivational force may be the product of valence and expectancy estimates. In such a case, 
an individual would be expected to respond equally to the outcome carrying a valence of 7 and 
an expectancy of .50 as to the outcome carrying a valence of 5 and an expectancy of .70. For 
others, however, the outcome with a valence of 5 and an expectancy of .70 may be more 
motivating than the outcome with a valence of 7 and an expectancy of .50, given the higher 
probability of success. Because such would be expected to influence the outcomes of a Chi- 
Square test and a correlational test, both findings may understate the role of valence and 
expectancy estimates. Thus, though this research clearly suggests that valence and 
expectancy estimates, in combination, underlie the goal selection process, the results of the 
aforementioned tests may understate the role of valence and expectancy due to individual 
differences in the weighting of such information.
Hypothesis 2 was a retest of the control systems model. It stated that when the focal 
standard and performance are disparate, the performer will elect to either increase effort or 
change the focal standard- The results of that test were consistent with those found by 
Campion and Lord (1982). When averaged across all time periods, subjects employed a 
control response (change of effort or change of standard) in the presence of a performance-
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standard disparity 73% of the time. Under the same conditions, the Campion and Lord (1982) 
study reported that subjects employed a control response 64% of the time. Further, consistent 
with the Campion and Lord (1982) study which unexpectedly found that 36% of the subjects 
made control responses in the presence of performance-standard congruence, this study 
found that 31% of the subjects made control responses under similar conditions. Not 
withstanding the possible contribution of measurement error, an integration of VIE and control 
theory would posit that such findings suggest that the control systems model, as tested by 
Campion and Lord (1982), was an underspecification. Specifically, though VIE theory would 
acknowledge that prior outcomes influence expectancy estimates, it would also suggest that 
prior outcomes, narrowly defined, are not the sole determinant of goal selection. Such a 
perspective would also highlight the expected value of the outcome. Though the integrated 
model acknowledges that information concerning the success of an immediate prior outcome 
aids prediction, it would also suggest that valence and expectancy estimates improve 
prediction. From this VIE-control systems perspective, when prediction was based solely on 
prior outcomes and valence and expectancy estimates were not considered, it is not surprising 
to find that of the 31 % who made a control response having obtained their preferred outcomes, 
that 57% lowered their effort or their standard, 39% increased their effort or their standard, and 
4% increased one and lowered the other.
Hypothesis 3, a further specification of the goal-setting control process, posited that 
when the focal standard and performance are disparate and the motivational force of the focal 
standard is no longer sufficient to elicit performance consistent with the standard, the 
performer will elect to change the focal standard. The results of this study revealed that 
subjects made smaller changes to the focal standard in the presence of a performance- 
standard disparity when the motivational force of standard remained prepotent than when the 
potency of the standard degraded. Further, this study revealed that in the presence of a 
performance-standard disparity, far fewer subjects made changes to their standard when the
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motivational force remained prepotent than when it did not. Unexpectedly, however, in the 
presence of a performance-standard disparity when the motivational force of their standard 
degraded, subjects were as likely as not to make a change to their standard. Though such a 
finding could be an artifact of measurement error, I suggest that it would be inappropriate to 
use such an explanation for an unpredicted result in a 4-cell test and then to suggest that the 
remaining 3-cells, which supported the hypothesis, were somehow impervious to such error. 
Thus, given the obtained cell patterns, it is more likely that another variable moderated the 
relation. Though such may be the case, attempts to identify a moderator were unsuccessful. 
Subjects for whom the motivational force of the standard no longer remained prepotent did not 
differ in self-focus, anxiety, or the amount of change in motivational force from subjects for 
whom the motivational force of the standard remained prepotent.
In sum, the results of these analyses suggest that subjects remain committed to their 
goals in the presence of a performance-standard disparity, when the motivational force of the 
standard remains prepotent. However, when the motivational force of the standard becomes 
degraded, behavior is less predictable.
Hypothesis 4, posited that performers will more frequently apply effort change to 
ameliorate performance-standard disparities when the motivational force of the focal standard 
remains prepotent than when the motivational force of the focal standard does not remain 
prepotent. The results of this study supported this hypothesis. When the motivational force of 
standard remained prepotent in the presence of a performance-standard disparity, 74.5% of 
the subjects increased their effort and 25.5% of the subjects made no effort change. Likewise, 
performers made greater effort changes in the presence of a performance-standard disparity 
when the motivational force remained prepotent than when it did not.
Though the above hypotheses, essential to the integration of VIE and control theory 
were supported, hypotheses 5 and 6, representing a further specification of an integrated 
model, were not.
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Hypothesis 5, posited that performers will more frequently rely on changes in effort to 
remediate a performance-standard disparity in the earlier stages of the performance process 
and will increasingly rely on changes in the focal standard in later stages of this process. The 
results of this study revealed no difference between the proportion of subjects who made 
standard changes in the earlier stages of the performance process and the proportion who 
made such changes in the later stages of the performance process. Though such a finding is 
inconsistent with the finding of Harrison et al. (1989), it is likely that two factors rendered the 
comparison ineffectual. First, this study compared the number of subjects who made standard 
changes during time 1-2, three to five weeks into the semester, to the number of subjects who 
made such changes during time 3-4, nine to twelve weeks into the semester. Additionally, 
approximately three weeks remained between the latter measure and the end of the 
performance period. Thus, the lack of support for the suggested temporal relation between 
control responses is likely a type II error. Because of the close temporal proximity of measures 
(time 1-2 and time 3-4) and that subjects had approximately three weeks following time 3-4 to 
make changes, an effect would likely go undetected.
Hypothesis 6, posited that the relation between the motivational force of potential 
standards (F|k = E.kVK) and the prioritization of potential standards will be stronger for persons 
high in self-focus than for persons low in self-focus. The results of this study were not 
supportive of this hypothesis; self-focus scores did not influence the relation between goal 
selection and motivational force. There was no difference between high self-focus and low self­
focus performers in the strength of this relation. Though it is difficult to account for such a 
finding, given the large sample size, it is unlikely that such was due to restriction of range, given 
an overall self-focus mean of 42.22, a standard deviation of 7.67, and an overall Z-score mean 
of .90, a standard deviation of 1.09.
Though this research was conducted in the context of goal setting, it should be noted 
that the VIE-control systems model was developed to account for self-regulated behavior. As
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such, aspects of this research, of specific interest to the goal setting literature, will be 
addressed next in the context of a more complete discussion of the model.
The VIE component of the integrated model suggests that we select behaviors for 
ourselves that we believe will lead to outcomes that are satisfying or worthwhile. It also 
suggests that such a choice occurs within the context of a field of behavioral options drawn 
from past personal experience or vicarious observation. Further, it suggests that our 
behavioral choice is moderated by our subjective estimates of the probability that preferred 
outcomes will follow. Thus, motivated to achieve desired outcomes, we select and shape our 
environment in ways that we believe will enhance the probability of success. At the same time, 
we continue to abstract information from our environment; we continue to assess our estimates 
of the worth or satisfaction we expect will follow from behavior and the probability that we will 
achieve our desired outcomes.
Though some would suggest that such a perspective is hedonistic, that it lowers the 
dignity of human behavior, I suggest that we must separate efforts to model the behavior 
process from efforts to advance human endeavor. If the integrated model predicts hedonistic 
behavior, it does so only because we find self-indulging behavior satisfying or worthwhile. If, 
however, we value equity, distributive and procedural justice, or self-actualization the 
predictions that follow from the integrated model will be of a different kind. Likewise, if we 
place a higher value on minimizing costs than on maximizing outcomes, are unaware of the full 
range of human potential, under-estimate the probability of success in our assessment of 
environmental conditions or perceive ourselves as ineffectual, we will set for ourselves 
standards of performance that are less than those that otherwise may be achieved.
The control component of the integrated model suggests that control responses, 
behavioral or cognitive, minimize performance-standard disparities. Because we continue to 
abstract information from our environment concerning the potential worth or satisfaction of 
outcomes and the probability of achieving preferred outcomes, subjective interpretation of
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performance feedback from our environment underlies the on-going assessment process. 
Thus, feedback mediates goal selection, in this dynamic process, through on-going 
assessment of the VIE component.
In the face of a performance-standard disparity, when the VIE component remains 
prepotent, we not only remain committed to our standard, but we change our effort to minimize 
performance-standard disparities. Given a prepotent standard, if the disparity takes the form of 
outcomes exceeding our standard, we will reduce effort to bring performance in line with the 
standard. Doing such, increases the potential value of the outcome by reducing its cost. 
Alternatively, if the disparity takes the form of outcomes falling short of the standard, we 
increase effort.
However, in the face of a performance-standard disparity, when the motivational force 
of the VIE component becomes degraded, we evoke cognitive change: abandon our 
commitment to prior standards and select for ourselves the outcome that currently carries the 
highest motivational force. Given a degraded standard, regardless of whether the outcome 
exceeds or fails to meet our standard, we select a standard consistent with our current 
motivational force.
Though the above control component could be viewed as a homeostatic process, the 
introduction of the VIE component suggests otherwise. Given that we are motivated to seek 
outcomes we believe will be satisfying or worthwhile, homeostasis follows from the integrated 
model only when we place high value on maintaining the status quo. Thus, the integrated 
model suggests that behavioral and cognitive attempts to minimize disparity should not be 
interpreted as pervasive efforts to achieve homeostasis, but rather, a result of attempts to 
achieve satisfying and worthwhile outcomes.
It is also important that we not overlook the hierarchical nature of the integrated model. 
Though the strength of the instrumental relation between first-level and second-level outcomes 
and the valence of second-level outcomes defines the valence of first-level outcomes, it should
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be noted that more distal objectives, by themselves, are seldom powerful enough to elicit on­
going behavior. Given our need to reduce uncertainty and that the reinforcement magnitude of 
potential outcomes diminishes as a function of reinforcement delay, a sub-goal approach to 
motivation, the Moses phenomenon, is essential to the maintenance of behavior. Despite the 
strength of Moses, chosen by God to lead the people of Israel to the promised land, a sign from 
God, through the burning bush, provided Moses the information needed to sustain and to act 
on his religious beliefs. Though the magnitude and the frequency of feedback necessary to 
sustain behavior may vary as a function of individual differences, only under extraordinary 
conditions should we expect that individuals will persevere in the absence of such information.
At one level of analysis, the VIE-control systems model and this research restates that 
we already knew. We find self-regulated behavior to be a control process in which the person 
extracts information from the environment and compares that information to a standard of 
performance. Further, we find that the information abstracted from the comparison process 
mediates self-regulation through behavioral or cognitive control responses. Along similar lines, 
we find that the multiplicative combination of the valence and the expectancy of a potential 
outcome exerts a force that motivates behavior. At another level of analysis, the VIE-controi 
systems model and this research suggest much more.
First, valence and expectancy estimates determine our standards of performance and 
mediate persistent behavior. Because the standards we select for ourselves are based on 
valence and expectancy estimates, commitment to a standard is a function of their potency. 
When the multiplicative combination of valence and expectancy is no longer prepotent, we no 
longer remain committed.
Second, driven to obtain outcomes that are worthwhile or satisfying, we continuously 
seek feedback from our environment to reduce uncertainty. We continue to abstract valence 
information to update our estimates of the potential satisfaction or the worth of future 
outcomes. Further, we continue to abstract expectancy information to guide behavior bearing
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on future outcomes.
Third, based on the valence-expectancy information that is abstracted from the 
standard and the environment, we engage control responses to facilitate the acquisition 
process. We make behavioral changes to bring performance in line with the standard or 
cognitive changes to bring the standard in line with valence and expectancy estimates. As 
such, homeostasis becomes a by-product of efforts to obtain preferred outcomes.
Though the results of this study provide strong support for the integration of VIE and 
control theory, this research did not attempt to test all aspects of the integrated model nor did it 
attempt to test all correlates. Further, this study did not attempt to objectively measure effort 
change. Likewise, it did not acknowledge alternative behavioral changes (e.g., dropping 
another course or lowering performance expectations in other areas that may compete with 
grade-goal objectives pertaining to this study). Nor did this study examine the influence of 
related cognitive processes (e.g., rationalization or attributionaf changes) on self-reported 
grade goals. More important, the results of this study may have been influenced by 
psychological reactance to the research design or by pre-test sensitization. Though it is likely 
that the lack of support for hypothesis five, which specified the temporal relation between 
behavioral and cognitive change, arises from deficient procedures, such an explanation is 
speculative and warrants further research. Likewise, additional research is needed to further 
specify the role of individual differences: differences in the weighting of valence-expectancy 
values, differences in the attentional process, and differences in the willingness to tolerate 
uncertainty and ambiguity mediated by delays of reinforcement.
Further, though the integrated model provides a better understanding of individual 
behavior, it is important to acknowledge that behavior frequently occurs in an interdependent 
social context. Given the findings of this research and that organizational behavior is heavily a 
person-interaction outcome, future research efforts should also consider possible links 
between the VIE-control systems model and interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978),
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an analysis of variance model of interdependent relations.
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Appendix A
Distribution of Grade-Goals for All Time Periods
#1 Goal: Most Preferred Grade Outcome
Grade Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Time 4
(n = 237) (n = 235) (n = 237) (n = 234)
A + 28% (n = 66) 9% (n = 21) 7% (n = 16) 15% (n = 34)
A 40% (n = 94) 34% (n = 81) 7% (n = 17) 3% (n = 7)
B + 19% (n = 46) 34% (n = 82) 41% (n = 96) 2% (n = 5)
B 10% (n = 25) 17% (n = 39) 29% (n = 70) 43% (n = 102)
C + 2% (n = 4) 5% (n = 11) 13% (n = 31) 21% (n = 49)
C 1% (n = 2) 1 % (n = 1) 3% (n = 7) 14% (n = 33)
D + 0% (n = 0) 0% (n = 0) 0% (n = 0) 1% (n =3)
D 0% (n = 0) 0% (n = 0) 0% (n = 0) 1% (n = 1)
F 0% (n = 0) 0% (n = 0) 0% (n = 0) 0% (n = 0)
#2 Goal: Second Preferred Grade Outcome
Grade Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Time 4
(n = 238) (n = 238) (n = 238) (n = 238)
A + 23% (n =  55) 11 % (n =  26) 6% (n =  15)
o'COIIcsOCOr-
A 38% (n =  90) 27% (n =  64) 8% (n =  20) 4% (n =  10)
B + 20% (n =  49) 35% (n =  83) 36% (n =  86) 5% (n = 11)
B 13% (n =  30) 17% (n =  42) 29% (n =  69) 39% (n =  94)
C  + 3% (n =  7) 7% (n =  17) 16% (n =  38) 21% (n =  50)
C 3% (n =  7) 3% (n =  6) 4% (n =  8) 16%(n =  38)
D + 0% (n =  0) 0% (n =  0) 1 %  (n =  2) 1% (n = 3)
D 0% (n = 0) 0% (n = 0) 0% (n = 0) 1% (n = 2)
F 0% (n = 0) 0% (n = U) 0% (n =  0) 0% (n =  0)
#3 Goal: Third Preferred Grade Outcome
Grade Time 1 
(n = 220)
Time 2 
(n = 220)
Time 3 
(n = 219)
Time 4 
(n = 218)
A + 20% (n = 45) 8% (n= 18) 5% (n= 10) 11% (n = 24)
A 32% (n = 71) 26% (n = 57) 6% (n= 14) 4% (n = 9)
B + 20% (n = 44) 32% (n = 69) 3 4 % (n = 75) 8% (n = 18)
B 17% (n = 37) 18% (n = 40) 29% (n = 64) 34% (n = 74)
C + 9% (n = 19) 9% (n = 19) 16% (n = 35) 22% (n = 47)
C 2% (n = 4) 6% (n = 14) 7% (n = 15) 15% (n = 33)
D + 0% (n = 0) 1 % (n = 3) 3% (n = 6) 4% (n = 8)
D 0% (n = 0) 0% (n = 0) 0% (n = 0) 2% (n = 5)
F 0% (n = 0) 0% (n = 0) 0% (n = 0) 0% (n = 0)
#4 Goal: Fourth Preferred Grade Outcome
Grade Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Time 4
(n = 207) (n = 207) (n = 206) (n = 207)
A + 20% (n = 41) 8% (n = 16) 4% (n = 9) 13% (n = 27)
A 29% (n =60) 25% (n = 51) 6% (n = 13) 1% (n = 3)
B + 23% (n = 47) 30% (n = 62) 30% (n = 61) 7% (n = 14)
B 18% (n = 37) 18% (n = 39) 27% (n = 55) 31% (n = 64)
C + 5% (n = 11) 14% (n = 29) 21% (n = 42) 19% (n = 38)
C 5% (n = 10) 4% (n =8) 8% (n = 17) 21% (n = 44)
D + 0% (n = 0) 1% (n = 2) 4% (n = 9) 4% (n = 8)
D 0% (n = 1) 0% (n = 0) 0% (n = 0) 4% (n =9)
F 0% (n = 0) 0% (n = 0) 0% (n = 0) 0% (n = 0)
Appendix B
RATING QUESTIONNAIRE
The following exercises are designed to develop a better understanding of student’s 
beliefs regarding the importance and probability of achieving specific course grades.
The overall format of the questionnaire is straightforward. There are no ’trick’ 
questions. For this reason, it is important that you clearly understand the instructions 
and that you do not hesitate to ask questions, at any time.
Before you begin rating, please provide the following information. 
Full Name:
First Name
Student Identification Number:
Middle Initial Last Name
Age: Sex: Major:
Status: Freshman Sophomore 
Home Phone Number:
Junior Senior
Work Phone Number:
Course Title:
Instructor:
Teaching Assistant:________________________________________________
Discussion Section:_________________________________________________
Day Time Section Number
Time Number (from researcher):_____________________________________
Please turn to the next page and continue.
RATING QUESTIONNAIRE PAGE NUMBER 1
Section 1: IMPORTANCE RATINGS
INSTRUCTIONS and IMPORTANCE RATING SCALE
You will be given a list of potential course grade outcomes and will be asked to judge 
the importance of each potential outcome. The following rating scale will be used tor 
these judgments:
Importance Rating Scale
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4
I l l I I I l I I|------ 1-------1--------1--------1-------1---------1------1-------- 1
I l I l I
Extrenely Moderately It nakea no Moderately Extresely
important inportant difference important important
to avoid to avoid either way to obtain to obtain
For each potential outcome, you will be asked to rate its IMPORTANCE. It is important 
that you note that IMPORTANCE RATINGS range from -4 to +4. Ratings preceded 
by a plus (+), are to be used for potential outcomes that you wish to achieve. Ratings 
preceded by a minus (-), are to be used for potential outcomes that you wish to avoid.
Before rating the IMPORTANCE of potential outcomes, read the outcome statement 
carefully. Then, circle the rating that best reflects the importance of the outcome.
Please turn to the next page and continue.
RATING QUESTIONNAIRE PAGE NUMBER 2
EXERCISE NUMBER 1.01
Instructions:
Circle your importance ratings.
Course Grade Outcomes
01) Obtain a course grade of A +
02) Obtain a course grade of A
03) Obtain a course grade of B+
04) Obtain a course grade of B
05) Obtain a course grade of C +
06) Obtain a course grade of C
07) Obtain a course grade of D +
08) Obtain a course grade of D
Importance Rating Scale
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4
I I I I I I i I ii— .— |— i— |— i— |— ,— |
I I l I l
Extremely Moderately It makes no Moderately Extremely
important important difference important important
to avoid to avoid either way to obtain to obtain
-4 -3 -2
-4 -3 -2
-4 -3 -2
-4 -3 -2
-4 -3 -2
-4 -3 -2
-4 -3 -2
-4 -3 -2
0 +1 +2 +3 +4
0 +1 +2 +3 +4
0 +1 +2 +3 +4
0 +1 +2 +3 +4
0 +1 +2 +3 +4
0 +1 +2 +3 +4
0 +1 +2 +3 +4
0 +1 +2 +3 +4
09) Obtain a course grade of F -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4
Please turn to the next page and continue.
RATING QUESTIONNAIRE PAGE NUMBER 3
Section 2: PROBABILITY RATINGS
INSTRUCTIONS and a PROBABILITY RATING SCALE
You will be given a list of potential course grade outcomes and will be asked to rate the 
probability that the combination of your ability and effort will result in the specific course 
grade outcomes.
The following rating scale will be used for this judgment:
Probability Rating Scale
01 101 201 301 401 501 601 701 80% 901 1001
I I I I l I I I I I l
You will be asked to rate the probability that the combination of your effort and ability will 
result in specific course grade outcomes. It is important that you note that PROBABILITY 
RATINGS range from 0% to 100%. A rating of 100% says that the combination of your 
effort/ability guarantees that you WILL OBTAIN the course grade outcome. A rating of 
0% says that the combination of your effort/ability guarantees that you WILL NOT 
OBTAIN the course grade outcome.
Please turn to the next page and continue.
RATING QUESTIONNAIRE PAGE NUMBER 4
There are 9 potential course grade outcomes. In addition to rating the probability of each 
outcome, you MUST ASSURE that when the probability ratings for all 9 outcomes are 
added together that they TOTAL 100%. This requirement could have several 
consequences. For example, if you rate the probability of any particular course grade 
outcome as 100%, all other ratings must be zero. Also, if the sum of the ratings exceeds 
100% or fails to total to 100%, you must review your ratings and make adjustments to 
achieve an exact total of 100%.
Please turn to the next page and continue.
RATING QUESTIONNAIRE PAGE NUMBER 5
EXERCISE NUMBER 2.01
Instructions:
Circle your probability rating and enter its value in the space to the right.
Probability Rating Scale
01 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 601 70% 801 901 1001
i i i i i i I i i i i
I_____ I____I_____ l____ I_____I____I_____ I_____ I____I______ I
01) Obtain a course grade of A + 01 101 201 301 401 501 601 701 801 901 1001
02) Obtain a course grade of A 01 101 201 301 401 501 601 701 801 901 1001
03) Obtain a course grade of B + 01 101 201 301 401 501 601 701 801 901 1001
04) Obtain a course grade of B 01 101 201 301 401 501 601 701 801 901 1001
05) Obtain a course grade of C+ 01 101 201 301 401 501 601 701 801 901 1001
06) Obtain a course grade of C 01 101 201 301 401 501 601 701 801 901 1001
07) Obtain a course grade of D + 01 101 201 301 401 501 601 701 801 901 1001
08) Obtain a course grade of D 01 101 201 301 401 501 601 701 801 901 1001
09) Obtain a course grade of F 01 101 201 301 401 501 601 701 801 901 1001
* TOTAL
*Before completing this exercise, please take time to add the probability ratings for 
the 9 course grade outcomes. If the sum of the ratings exceeds 100% or fails to 
total to 100%, you must review your ratings and make adjustments to achieve an 
exact total of 100%.
RATING QUESTIONNAIRE PAGE NUMBER 6
Appendix C
PRE-TEST QUESTIONNAIRE
Please provide the following information.
Full Name:_________________________________________________________
First Name Middle Initial Last Name
Student Identification Number:______________________________________
Course Title:_______________________________________________________
Time Number (from researcher):_____________________________________
04) What is the minimum grade you would be satisfied with in the course? 
Circle one: A+ A B +  B C +  C D +  D F
05) What is the most important reason that you obtain your 
minimum grade (item 4 above)?
Circle one: 1 To continue in an athletic program
2 To receive financial aid or reimbursement
3 To get into graduate school
4 Other (please explain below)
06) What is the grade you will actually try for in this course?
Circle one: A+ A B +  B C +  C D +  D F
07) Using the following Difficulty Rating Scale, please rate how difficult you believe it will 
be to obtain each of the 9 performance outcomes listed below.
0
i
I
1
1
1
2
I
i
3
l
l
4
I
5
I
I
6
I
II
i
Not
I
Somewhat
1
I
Very
1
I
Extremely
difficu lt d ifficult d ifficu lt d ifficu lt
.01 Obtain a course grade of A + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
02 Obtain a course grade of A 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
03 Obtain a course grade of B + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
04 Obtain a course grade of B 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Please turn to the next page and continue.
PRE-TEST PAGE NUMBER 1
Not Somewhat Very Extremely
d ifficu lt d ifficu lt d ifficu lt d ifficult
05 Obtain a course grade of C + 0 2 3 4 5 6
06 Obtain a course grade of C 0 2 3 4 5 6
07 Obtain a course grade of D + 0 2 3 4 5 6
08 Obtain a course grade of D 0 2 3 4 5 6
09 Obtain a course grade of F 0 2 3 4 5 6
09) Using the Characteristic Rating Scale, please rate the extent to which you believe the 
following seventeen (17) statements are characteristic of you.
0 1 2  3 4
Extremely Uncharacteristic Occasionally Characteristic Extremely
.01 I’m always trying to 
figure myself out.
.02 Generally, 17 m not 
very aware of myself.
.03 I reflect about myself 
a lot.
.04 I’m often the subject 
of my own fantasies.
.05 I never scrutinize myself.
.06 I’m generally attentive 
to my inner feelings.
.07 I’m constantly examining 
my motives.
.08 I sometimes have the 
feeling that I’m off 
somewhere watching 
myself.
Uncharacteristic
0
Characteristic
2
Characteristic
4
Please turn to the next page and continue.
PRE-TEST PAGE NUMBER 2
I I I I I
Extrem ely Uncharacteristic Occasionally Characteristic Extremely
Characteristic
.09 I’m alert to changes 
in my mood.
.10 I’m aware of the way 
my mind works when 
I work through a problem.
. 11 I’m concerned about my 
style of doing things.
.12 I’m concerned about the 
way I present myself.
.13 I’m self-conscious about 
the way I look.
.14 I usually worry about
making a good impression.
.15 One of the last things 
I do before I leave my 
house is look in the mirror.
.16 I’m concerned about what 
other people think of me.
.17 I’m usually aware of 
my appearance.
Uncharacteristic
0
Characteristic
2 3
13) In what courses are you currently enrolled? 
Course Name__________________________ Credit Hours
Please turn to the next page and continue.
PRE-TEST PAGE NUMBER 3
10) Below are 9 grade outcomes that could result from taking this course. Of the 9 
grade outcomes, please select your TOP FOUR GRADE GOALS. Please indicate by 
placing a one (1) in front of the statement that best reflects your number one (1) 
goal. After placing a one (1) in front of your number one (1) goal, place a two (2) in 
front of your number two (2) goal. Continue this process until you have rank 
ordered your TOP FOUR GRADE GOALS.
Please begin.
_______ .01 Obtain a course grade of A +
_______ .02 Obtain a course grade of A
_______ .03 Obtain a course grade of B +
_______ .04 Obtain a course grade of B
_______ .05 Obtain a course grade of C +
_______ .06 Obtain a course grade of C
_______ .07 Obtain a course grade of D +
_______ .08 Obtain a course grade of D
_______ .09 Obtain a course grade of F
Please turn to the next page and continue.
PRE-TEST PAGE NUMBER 4
14) A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given 
below. Using the rating scale provided, please indicate how you feel, at this time, 
about the grade you will eventually receive in this course.
.01 I feel calm about the 
course grade that I will 
eventually receive.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 i i I i I i
i— '— l— 1— i— 1— ii i I i
Not at Somewhat M oderately Very much
all so so SO
.02 I feel tense about the 
course grade that I will
eventually receive. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
.03 I feel at ease about the 
course grade that I will
eventually receive. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
.04 I feel anxious about the 
course grade that I will
eventually receive. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
.05 I feel comfortable about the 
course grade that I will
eventually receive. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
.06 I am worried about the 
course grade that I will
eventually receive. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
.07 I feel content about the 
course grade that I will
eventually receive. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
.08 I feel nervous about the 
course grade that I will
eventually receive. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
.09 I am relaxed about the 
course grade that I will
eventually receive. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
PRE-TEST PAGE NUMBER 5
Appendix D
POST-TEST/PRE-TEST QUESTIONNAIRE
Please provide the following information.
Full Name:________________________________________________________
First Name Middle Initial Last Name
Student Identification Number:_____________________________________
01) What score (number of points) did you receive on the last test? 
number of points_____
02) What grade did you receive on the last test?
Circle one: A+ A B +  B C +  C D +  D F
03) Last time you completed these questionnaires, you indicated the minimum course 
grade that you would be satisfied with. In the light of your test grade(s),
how do things look at this time?
Circle one: 1 I see no problem.
2 With a little luck, I should get the grade.
3 I will wait and see what happens on the next test before I take 
any action.
4 My test performance is too far from that minimum course 
grade. The time has come to make some changes.
04) What is the minimum grade you would be satisfied with in this course?
Circle one: A + A B +  B C +  C D +  D F
05) What is the most important reason that you obtain your 
minimum grade (item 4 above)?
Circle one: 1 To continue in an athletic program
2 To receive financial aid or reimbursement
3 To get into graduate school
4 Other (please explain below)
06) What is the grade you will actually try for in this course? 
Circle one: A + A B +  B C +  C D +  D F
Please turn to the next page and continue.
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07) Using the following Difficulty Rating Scale, please rate how difficult you believe it 
will be to obtain each of the 9 performance outcomes listed below.
0
.01 Obtain a course grade of A +
Not
difficu lt 
0 1
Somewhat
d ifficu lt
2 3
Very 
difficult 
4 5
Extremely
difficult
6
.02 Obtain a course grade of A 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
.03 Obtain a course grade of B + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
.04 Obtain a course grade of B 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
.05 Obtain a course grade of C + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
.06 Obtain a course grade of C 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
.07 Obtain a course grade of D + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
.08 Obtain a course grade of D 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
.09 Obtain a course grade of F 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
08) Prior to the next exam, how much effor do you intend to spend preparing
for the next exam as compared to the last exam?
Circle one: 1 much less
2 a little less
3 about the same
4 a little more
5 much more
6 alotmore
7 extraordinarily more
Please turn to the next page and continue.
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10) Below are 9 grade outcomes that could result from taking this course. Of the 9 
grade outcomes, please select your TOP FOUR GRADE GOALS. Please indicate by 
placing a one (1) in front of the statement that best reflects your number one (1) 
goal. After placing a one (1) in front of your number one (1) goal, place a two (2) in 
front of your number two (2) goal. Continue this process until you have rank 
ordered your TOP FOUR GRADE GOALS.
Please begin.
.01 Obtain a course grade of A +
.02 Obtain a course grade of A
.03 Obtain a course grade of B +
.04 Obtain a course grade of B
.05 Obtain a course grade of C +
.06 Obtain a course grade of C
.07 Obtain a course grade of D +
.08 Obtain a course grade of D
.09 Obtain a course grade of F
Please turn to the next page and continue.
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11) Compared to the last exam, how much effort will you give studying for the next 
exam?
Circle one: -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4
i i i i i i tj _ _ _ i _ _ _ _ j _ _ _ _ i _ _ _ _ j _ _ _ _ i _ _ _ _ _ j
i i i i
Much About Much Extraordinarily
less the same more more
12) In question number eleven (11), above, you indicated how much effort you will give 
on the next exam as compared to the last exam. Please explain your rating.
13) In what courses are you currently enrolled?
Course Name__________________________________________ Credit Hours
Please turn to the next page and continue.
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14) A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given 
below. Using the rating scale provided, please indicate how you feel, at this time, 
about the grade you will eventually receive in this course.
,01 I feel calm about the 
course grade that I will 
eventually receive.
i i i i i i i|------ !------1------ '------1------ '------1I t I I
Not at Somewhat M oderately Very much
all so so SO
.02 I feel tense about the 
course grade that I will
eventually receive. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
.03 I feel at ease about the 
course grade that I will
eventually receive. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
.04 I feel anxious about the 
course grade that I will
eventually receive. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
.05 I feel comfortable about the 
course grade that I will
eventually receive. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
.06 I am worried about the 
course grade that I will
eventually receive. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
.07 I feel content about the 
course grade that I will
eventually receive. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
.08 I feel nervous about the 
course grade that I will
eventually receive. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
.09 I am relaxed about the 
course grade that I will
eventually receive. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
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